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SUGGESTED STATUTORY STANDARDS
FOR THE APPLICATION OR
NON-APPLICATION OF SECTION 531
E. K. SNYDER*
Section 531 of the Internal Revenue Code is as old as the post-
XVIth Amendment income tax. The Tariff Act of 1913 provided for
a penalty tax to be imposed on the shareholders if the corporate device
was used to reduce the surtax on an individual income.' Following the
landmark decision of Eisner v. Macomber,2 where the majority opinion
indicated that the shareholder could not be taxed on corporate profits
prior to their distribution, the Revenue Act of 1921 imposed the penalty
tax on the corporation, where it has since remained. Provision was
made in the 1921 act for a consent dividend.3
The reason that Congress has considered a penalty necessary to
prevent shareholder tax avoidance by simply failing to pay dividends is
readily apparent inasmuch as no satisfactory system has been devised
to tax corporate profits only once, except to the limited extent available
in Subchapter S. Where Subchapter S is not available, or where indi-
vidual marginal rates of tax are higher than the marginal corporate
rate, one time taxation of corporate profits is an obvious goal for those
who a priori place a low marginal utility factor on additional personal
income in hand.
The various revenue acts since 1921 have all been directed at ac-
cumulations of earnings, 4 but as a practical matter accumulated earn-
ings have never been taxed under Section 531 and its predecessors.
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School (1948); formerly General Counsel, the Ohio Steel Foundry Company;
Assistant Controller, Mechanical Handling Systems, Inc.; Instructor, Account-
ing, University of Detroit; tax staff, Richwine, Newton & Carlton, Monroe,
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versity, School of Business Administration; member of the Michigan, Ohio,
and District of Columbia Bars; C.P.A., Michigan, member of the A.B.A. and
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"For the purpose of this additional tax the taxable income of any individual
shall embrace the share to which he would have been entitled of the gains and
profits, if divided or distributed, whether divided or distributed or not, of all
corporations, joint-stock companies or associations however created or organ-
ized, formed or fraudulently availed of for the purpose of preventing the
imposition of such tax through the medium of permitting such gains and
profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." Act of October
3, 1913, § II, (A), (2) ; 38 Stats. 114 at 166.
2 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
3 Act of November 23, 1921, § 220; 42 Stats. 227 at 247.
4 INT. RyE. CODE OF 1954, § 532: "The accumulated earnings tax imposed by
section 531 shall apply to every corporation .... formed or availed of for the
purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders . . ." Id.
§ 533(a) : "the fact that the earnings and profits of a corporation are per-
mitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be
determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to share-
holders."
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There are no cases on record where the penalty was assessed because
of the size of the earnings retention. The tax itself is an additional
assessment on the earnings of a particular year rather than a levy on a
retained earnings account. The tax is a penalty imposed upon closely
held corporations showing excessive liquidity or whose fiscal activities
are inconsistent with the non-payment of dividends. Let us examine,
briefly, these three areas:
Closely Held Corporations
There is only one instance on record of a corporation with a large
number of shareholders being assessed a Section 531 penalty, the
famous Trico case,5 and "That corporation was in effect a privately
owned corporation, as a minority of 21 shareholders owned approxi-
mately 75% of the stock and controlled the corporation, although there
were about 2200 other stockholders." There is nothing in the statutory
language exempting publicly-held corporations from the tax 7 and an
attempt by the House to insert such a provision was rejected by the
Senate in 1954.
It has long been the law in Section 531, as elsewhere, to infer intent
from overt actions." It strains one's credulity to believe that directors
of publicly held corporations disregard the effects upon their personal
income tax liabilities of the dividend actions which they take. It has
been said:
Historically, section 102 has been applied to the compara-
tively small closely held and closely controlled corporations rather
than to the large public corporations. Admittedly, the existence
of the interdicted purpose would be more likely to occur in the
case of private corporations in which there is a close or complete
identity of shareholders and corporate officers (i.e., corporate
directors). On the other hand, there is much evidence which indi-
cates that many of our large public corporations are subject to
control, either directly or indirectly, by small groups of share-
holders who, it may be presumed, are not unconscious of per-
sonal surtax savings resulting from surplus accumulation. Large
numbers of shareholders should not be permitted to disguise
the existence of a control group and the possible shaping of
corporate' policy to serve personal advantage. In view of the
purpose and intent of the section, it appears that the Bureau
might properly direct attention to public, as well as to private,
corporations. 9
S46 B.T.A. 346 (1942) ; aff'd 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1943).
67 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 39.34 at 75 (supp. 1966).
7 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 532.
8 Although intent is a state of mind, it is nevertheless a fact to be proved andfound as are other facts. William C. DeMille Productions, Inc., 30 B.T.A.
826 (1934).
9 Kendall, Joint Committee on the Economic Report 82nd Congress, 2d Session
187 (1952).
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After the Trico tax case was decided unfavorably to the Corpora-
tion, there was a minority stockholder suit against its Directors. The
literature of the day was rife with speculation that the suffering of a
Section 531 penalty would, ipso facto, make Directors liable to damages
in stockholder suits. The Trico stockholder suits were settled out of
court and there is, accordingly, no authority on this subject one way
or the other. Perhaps the Treasury reasons that attempted enforcement
against publicly held corporations would raise such a hue and cry as to
result in outright repeal of Section 531. There is some ground for the
Treasury's fear. The 1946 Corporate Return contained the "infamous"
question 810 which merely queried a taxpayer regarding a standard set
by the Treasury in Treasury Decision 4914,11 for the guidance of ex-
amining agents. Even though Treasury Decision 4914 was-seven years
old by 1946, the hue and cry which resulted from question 8 may well
have accounted for the dropping of the question from subsequent re-
turns. Whatever may be the Treasury's reasons for non-enforcement
against publicly held corporations, in spite of apparently ample grounds,
as we shall discover later, the record speaks for itself notwithstanding
the statutory language and what appears to be clear Congressional in-
tent.
Apollo Industries, Inc.12 is not an exception to the foregoing even
though that company is listed on the Amercian, Pacific Coast, and
Pittsburgh Stock Exchanges. Apollo Industries, Inc. is the successor
in interest to Alles and Fisher, Inc. which was acquired by Apollo in
1962. The years under review were 1956 and 1957.13
10 "If the total of line 1 or Schedule M, page 4, is less than 70 percent of the
earnings and profits for the taxable year, state reasons for retention of such
earnings and profits. (See instruction J)."
1"(1) Corporations which have not distributed at least 70 percent of their
earnings.(2) Corporations which have invested earnings in securities or other properties
unrelated to their normal business activities.
(3) Corporations which have advanced sums to officers or shareholders in
the form of loans out of undistributed profits or surplus from which tax-
able dividends might have been declared.(4) Corporations, a majority of whose stock is held by a family group or
other small group of individuals, or by a trust or trusts for the benefit of
such groups.
(5) Corporations the distributions of which, while exceeding 70 percent of
their earnings, appear to be inadequate when considered in connection with
the nature of the business or the financial position of the corporation or
corporations with accumulations of cash or other quick assets which appear
to be beyond the reasonable needs of the business."
1244 T.C. 1 (1965), rev'd 358 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1966).
13 It is interesting to note that several section 531 defendants have subsequently
"gone public." The marked increase in the prices of some of them make one
speculate whether today's defendants might, not well be the "hot stocks" of
tomorrow. American Metal Products Corp., 34 T.C. 89 (1960), aff'd 287 F.2d
860 (8th Cir. 1961); Becton, Dicinsion & Co., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 42-441,
aff'd 134 F.2d 354 (3rd Cir. 1943); Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304
U.S. 282 (1938); Olin Corp., 42 B.T.A. 1203 (1940), aff'd 128 F.2d 185 (7th
Cir. 1942) ; Seaboard Security Co., 38 B.T.A. 560 (1938) ; Wean Engineering
Co., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 43-348 (1943).
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Excessive Liquidity
This has been and remains the area of great mystery in Section 531
and at the same time is the reason for the vast majority of assessments.
The chain of reasoning runs something like this: There is a statutory
prohibition against accumulating earnings and profits beyond the reason-
able needs of the business. The best way to exemplify unreasonable
accumulations is to be liquid beyond the needs of the business. Ergo,
excessive liquidity calls for the sanctions. Dr. James K. Hall wrote in
1952 and, in reviewing all the cases to that date said,14
The critical factor in vulnerability under the section appears
to be the liquidity ratio. The ratios of earned surplus to total
assets and current assets to current liabilities do not appear to
be significant, per se, because of a large earned surplus which
may be representative of real assets, and a very favorable ratio
of current assets to current liabilities may be an expression of
a very small amount of current liabilities. Retention of a large
proportion of current earnings may not cause the corporation to
become excessively liquid-and, hence, vulnerable. To avoid
section 102, however, the corporation must be able to explain sat-
isfactorily to the Bureau its high liquidity-which is the danger
signal.
Inasmuch as the predecessors of Section 531 were used against both
operating and holding companies prior to 1934, when the first Personal
Holding Company sections were enacted, the proportion of cases in-
volving liquidity as compared to other reasons has risen since 1952.
The literature is replete with suggestions as to factors by which liquid-
ity can be judged as excessive or not excessive and there have been
several judicial attempts to set standards starting with Goodman'5 and
most recently in Bardahl,1 6 but it would be a brave counsellor, indeed,
who would attempt to set a workable liquidity standard for a client.
Historically, these judicial attempts to set standards began in 1948
with Goodman.17 In reviewing the years 1942 and 1943 where income
was $127,009 and $130,113 respectively, $36,000 in dividends having
been paid in each year, the Court said, "The evidence also shows that
a large amount of cash was necessary in order to operate the business.
For example, its returns show that its annual operating expenses
amounted to more than $162,000 during the years 1942 and 1943. There
was a reasonable necessity for sufficient capital to meet operating ex-
penses for at least one year."
Recognizing that the business cycle might very well be longer or
shorter than a calendar or fiscal year, the court said in Smoot Sand&
14 Kendall, supra note 9 at 137.
15 11 T.C. 530 (1948).
16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65-200 (1965).
17 Note 15 supra.
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Gravel Corp.,8 "Working capital needs of a business vary, being de-
pendent upon the nature of the business, its credit policies, the amounts
of inventories and rate of turnover, the amount of accounts receivable
and the collection rate thereof, the availability of credit to the business,
and similar relevant factors."
In a decision promulgated on April 2, 1965, the Tax Court indi-
cated that a more precise definition of liquidity than the previous gen-
eralizations was needed. In Apollo Industries, Inc.19 the Tax Court
said:
The petitioner maintains, however, that additional funds were
required for ordinary business operations. As evidence of this
alleged need, the petitioner presented certain testimony and com-
putations by the certified public accountant who had prepared
Alles' financial statements. The accountant applied what he
termed a "rule of thumb" and added for each of the taxable years
in question, amounts equal to the closing accounts receivable, the
closing inventory, the total operating expenses for the year (ex-
cluding depreciation), and the fixed assets acquired during the
year, to arrive at a figure purportedly representing the amount of
capital needed for Alles' operations. He testified that his compu-
tations had been prepared in connection with the trial of the case,
having been "thought of by our attorney," and there is no indica-
tion that any similar analysis had been made for Alles during the
taxable years....
The petitioner may not rely merely upon a rule of thumb to
establish the alleged needs for working capital where the evidence
not only does not support the method employed, but requires a
contrary conclusion.
Not quite four months later, the Tax Court came up with its elabor-
ate formulation in the first Bardahl case.2' The accounting in Bardahl
is performed with all the glorious logic of the ten-column work-sheet.
All this precision, however, follows a finding that an intra-year busi-
ness cycle is 35% of a fiscal year, accordingly, 35% of anticipated costs
for the next fiscal year is non-excessive liquidity. To this reviewer, the
35% finding sems to be rather "rule of thumbish", nonetheless it is used
to determine, with caliper-like precision, the odd-dollar amounts which
represent excess-liquidity, as follows:
1956 1957 1958 1959
A. Net liquid assets $500,063 $639,824 $764,789 $1,090,729
B. Anticipated
operating expenses,
one cycle 293,400 480,000 488,000 488,100
18241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1957).
1944 T.C. at 14, 15.
20 Note 16, supra.
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C. Extraordinary
Anticipated needs
of the business 320,610 345,500 223,571 465,553
D. Excess Liquidity
(C + B- A) (113,947) (185,676) 53,218 137,07621
To the excess liquidity so neatly determined, the amounts of invest-
ments and loans unrelated to the business are added to determine the
amount subject to the penalty tax. Thus, for 1956, there is determined
to be a working capital deficiency of $113,947. Unrelated to the business
investments and loans of $86,333 and $50,000 respectively, when added
to this negative figure, leave precisely $22,386 subject to Section 531
penalties for that year.
Bardahl was decided before the First Circuit Court of Appeals heard
the appeal in Apollo22 and the Bardahl formula was adopted by that
Court in spite of some apparent misgivings on the part of the Treasury
with its own handiwork:
Our analysis is similar to that followed in Bardahl Mfg. Corp.
v. Commissioner. In that case the Court determined petitioner's
needs for working capital by computing the amount of cash rea-
sonably expected to be sufficient tb cover its operating costs for a
single operating cycle. Such a cycle consists of the period of time
required to convert cash into raw materials, raw materials into
inventory of marketable products, the inventory into sales and
accounts receivable, and the period of time required to collect its
outstanding acounts. No specific reason has been- suggested to
us, in brief or argument, why such an approach is not appropri-
ate. All that government counsel have said is that it "fails to
take into consideration all of the relevant factors."
The business of the Bardahl interests is conducted by two corpora-
tions. The 1965 decision applied only to the manufacturing corporation.
The sales corporation came before the Tax Court in 1966.23 The tax-
payer argued that the'division of the year into cycles was over-precise
because many expenses of the business, for example the costs of an ad-
vertising campaign, occur early in the year, therefore, the liquidity
necessary to cover the costs of a particular intra-year cycle are not the
same for all cycles. This further logical extension of Goodman, Smoot,
and first Bardahl itself was rejected by the Court. It is extremely inter-
esting to note that the Tax Court itself designated both Bardahl cases
as memoranda decisions whereas Apollo was a reported decision. Does
this imply, except in the First Circuit, that the Tax Court rejects rules
of thumb and that the precision of Bardahl signifies nothing more than
the disposition of that case?
21 Ibid.
22 Note 12, supra.
2 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 66-182 (1966).
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Evidently, the Court of Claims finds little precedent value in Bar-
dahl.24 In Halby Chemical Company, Inc. v. United States,25 30% of
anticipated sales is allowed as non-excess liquidity. This is highly sig-
nificant because in Bardahl the proration of working capital needs is
on the anticipated cash expense needs of the business. An argument
that income taxes be allowed among the expenses was rejected. None-
theless, Halby is allowed cash expenses, non-cash expenses such as de-
preciation, taxes, and profit itself. The Court in Halby stresses the fact
that the taxpayer is a small company competing- with such giants as
DuPont, hence its needs for conservative fiscal policies. Bardahl not
only competes with DuPont, but also with Shell, General Motors, -and
Chrysler. In spite of the vast difference in results between Bardahl and
Halby, the Court sounds like the spirit of Goodman and Smoot: "His
assignment of 30% of anticipated anhual sales to cover working capital
needs for inventory, accounts receivable, and cash requirements is like-
wise indicative of his conservative management goals. It is true, as
pointed out by defendant, that in each of his companies manufacturing
processes of the various products were completed in a matter of hours,
inventory was turned over in 30 days) accounts receivable were col-
lected promptly (with almost no losses through bad debts), wherefore
the corporations' needs for working capital should have been provided
on a cyclical basis (of 3 or 4 months) instead of being based on annual
forecasts."
We are 'not given much financial data on which to analyze Halby
further. No balance sheets are provided and we- are only told that the
current ratio for the years- under review. is between 4 and 5 to 1, and
that about ten percent of earnings have been paid in dividends. Ex-
trapolating on the information available, it would appear that the same
determiner of fact who allowed Bardahl 35% of annual costs would
have allowed Halby something less than 15% of costs, rather than 30%
of sales.
Is there now, following first and second Bardahl, Apollo, and Halby
a viable judicial standard for -non-excess liquidity? To be sure, the
arithmetic used to determine the precise amount to be taxed each year
at Section 531 rates is measured with the frenzied slide-rule of the cost
accountant in Bardahl. No rule of thumb, following Apollo in the Tax
Court, is appropriate. Yet the rejection of the argument of second
Bardahl that even within the business cycle there must be a staggering
of requirements makes one suspicious that the finder of excess liquidity
fact could just as easily back into his percentage, after having first
decided the amount of excess liquidity by the seat of his pants, if
thumbs cannot be used. Hindsight decision as to prospective extraordin-
24P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65-200 (1965).
25 Court of Claims N. 186-65 (June 9, 1967), 19 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1589.
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ary needs of the business in Bardahl appears to be subject, on a fore-
sight basis, to the statisticians give or take a billion. What is the sig-
nificance, to the advisor, of the gulf between Bardahl and Halby? Is the
advice to be to pay the tax and to sue for a refund in the Court of
Claims? This is hardly a firm basis for a foresighted business decision
which must be made during or immediately following the year under
review. To repeat, it would be a brave counsellor, indeed, who would
attempt to set a workable liquidity standard for a client.
At this time certain voluntary actions, however, are an open to ad-
mission of being water-logged. Thus, if it has sufficient idle current
assets to enable it to make loans to shareholders, make casual invest-
ments unrelated to its business, or redeem some of its outstanding
shares "Quite naturally the question immediately arises as to why the
corporation does not pay dividends to its shareholders, if it is able to
make loans to them out of its earning and profits. ' ' 26 In fact, the first
case tried under the rationale of Section 531 was a situation where the
corporation had borrowed in order to make loans to its sole share-
holder.27 Since the enactment of the Personal Holding Company sec-
tions28 in 1934, loans and casual investments have been relatively un-
important in Section 531 enforcement.
In the third instance of actions which admit hyperliquidity, redemp-
tions, there have been a number of interesting cases over the years.
Redemptions and Section 531 are particularly intriguing because it may
well be that the Congress has baited a trap in allowing inter-vivos re-
demptions 29 at capital gains rates and what will more often than not be
tax-free treatment" to redemptions by an estate. The redemption sec-
tions are in no way coordinated with Section 531 even though it would
appear that they were specifically designed as relief measures for the
very type of successful closely-held corporation against whom Section
531 has always been invoked.
A redemption of 50 percent of outstanding shares by the heirs of a
"partner" has been allowed where the redemption took the form of a
debt to the redeeming shareholders. 31 Obviously, the Court felt that no
trap had been intended when it said, "When Congress specifically pro-
vided favorable tax treatment for such transactions and sought to en-
courage them to facilitate the administration of estates, it hardly could
have intended to penalize the corporation for doing the favored act."'32
26 7 MERTENS, supra note 6, § 39.34 at 75 (supp. 1966).
27 United Business Corporation of America, 19 B.T.A. 809 (1930), 62 F.2d 754
(2d Cir. 1933).
28 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 541 et seq.
29 Id. § 302.
3oId. § 303.
31 Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960).32 Id. at 745.
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While the Court's opinion as to a possible trap is unequivocal, it is
nonetheless describing a Section 303 testamentary redemption whereas
the case itself involved a Section 302 inter-vivos redemption, in that the
heirs, not the estate, had redeemed the shares.
Where it was shown that dissident minority shareholders were re-
deemed, no penalty was assessed.3 3 But where a dissident majority
interest was redeemed, the penalty was imposed. 34 A dissident majority
is certainly an anomoly, yet insofar as the corporate taxpayer itself
was concerned it was just that, had there been no redemption the cor-
poration would have lost its independent existence. The standard for
the closely-held corporation at the time of redeeming its shares is obvi-
ously no more clearly discernable than the standard for liquidity, even
if the redemption is accomplished by borrowing. Only if the corporation
accumulates liquid assets to prepare for a redemption specifically author-
ized in Sections 302 and 303 can it be certain of the consequences. It
pays the penalty.
The Counsellor of the closely-held company is hard pressed not only
by the problems of uncertainty as to how much liquidity is too much or
whether a particular option is available to his client, but to explain
why a publicly held company can cross, apparently with impunity, any
of the hair-triggers which would bring almost automatic sanctions on
the closely-held company. For example, under the rationale that the
very act of making a casual investment proves dividends could have
been paid and in the spirit of Treasury Decision 4914, a closely-held
company owning approximately 6%, .02%, and 1% of the shares of
Owens-Illinois Glass, U.S. Steel, and Libby-Owens-Ford respectively
would be automatically suspect, yet Allied Chemical is in that situation.3 5
We have seen that redemption of one's shares by a closely-held com-
pany frequently brings a law-suit, yet Curtis-Wright and Schenley have
redeemed substantial portions of their outstanding shares in recent
years. Schenley is particularly interesting in view of the concentrated
holding of about 30% of its shares. Filtrol Corporation as of December
31, 1966, had a current ratio of 23/1, with the bulk of its assets in-
vested in tax-exempts.36 What of the maker of a tender-offer? The pur-
pose of the foregoing is not J'accuse, but to point out that a double
standard of enforcement does in fact exist and one can infer that offi-
cial tenderness toward small business ceases when small business be-
comes successful. Our target is not Treasury enforcement of Section
531, but the law itself.
33 Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self, 103 F. Supp. 779 (D.C.E.D. Ark. 1952); Dill
Manufacturing Co., 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939).
34 Pelton, 28 T.C. 153 (1939).
35 Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks.
36 Standard & Poor's Listed Stock Reports.
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Conclusion
In several much-litigated areas the Congress has seen fit, over the
years, to adopt standards of conduct which at least allow the taxpayer
to chart a safe course. There are several instances of this. For example,
the ten years trust 37 which laid a firm foundation under the fruit and
tree uncertainty raised by the Clifford Case.38 Another example is the
rule that only gifts made within three years of death are rebuttably pre-
sumed to have been made in contemplation of death.3 Prior to this
amendment, literally any gift made at any time might be considered to
be in contemplation of death. Similarly with the rules on corporate re-
organizations. 40 For some twenty years the Treasury itself felt that
standards of conduct in the Section 531 area were viable.41
It is recommended, therefore, that the following statutory standards
be adopted in connection with Section 531, to be applied in the alterna-
tive.
1. Prohibited Acts. Loans to shareholders would be presumed to
bring the corporation under the sanctions of Section 531. Frequently,
closely held corporations make advances to their shareholders during
the year 'for both corporate and personal reasons. Mere convenience to
the shareholder should not be proscribed, but an advance which is
cleared for a few days as at the end of the 'fiscal year should not be
allowed. Therefore, a standard providing that advances to shareholders
shall be repaid within 30 days after they have been made, or accounted
for as an expense within 90 days, would provide the convenience which
does not violate the spirit of the Section and, at the same time, a work-
able rule.
Investments in unrelated securities should be permitted, in any total
management determines. If such investments are, in fact, a majority
interest in another enterprise, or convertible into a majority interest in
another enterprise, they should not be deemed to be "for the purpose of
avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the share-
holders of any other corporation, by permitting earnings and profits to
accumulate instead of being divided or distributed."42 The purpose of
this proviso is to bring the closely-held company into something ap-
proaching parity with the publicly-held company insofar as diversifica-
tion is concerned. The publicly-held company can diversify with less
than a majority interest.
37 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 673.
38 Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
39 Id. § 2035.
40Id. § 351.
41 Note 11, supra. T.D. 4914 was issued in 1939 as a guide for examining agents.
T.D. 5398, issued in 1944, amended T.D. 4914 by requiring every agent's re-
port to include a resume of Section 531 status. T.D. 4914 was revoked by T.D.
6378, issued in 1959.
42 INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 532(a).
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If such investments comprise -less than a majority interest, their
total should be considered as a current asset in connection with liquidity
standards to be discussed later. Following the rationale of Goodman,
Smoot, and Bardahl,43 management should be free to. keep its reserves
for future expansion, replacement, and competitive purposes in such
securities it deems appropriate.
2. The statute should apply -only to closely-held companies. The
existing administrative attitude should be confirmed by statute. It is sug-
gested that a concentration of ten percent ownership, subject to attribu-
tion rules, be deemed to be sufficient for the corporation to be influenced
in its dividend decisions' by the marginal tax rates of the owners of the
ten percent interest.
3. Payment of 60% of current year'earnings in dividends. The pres-
ent rules relative to dividends paid found in Section 561 'IRC should
continue to apply. There is no really good rason for placing the rule at
60%, rather than 50 or 70 except that it is somewhat higher than the
rate currently in vogue for the 30 companies which make up the Dow-
Jones Index. The remaining 40% of earnings would, of course, 'tend to
increase liquidity for future years. However, the tax is imposed upon
the earnings of a given year and the dividends attributable to that year,
following Section 561, would exempt that year, future year's to fend
for themselves, and also being exempted if ther met the dividend or
some other standard. The 40% of earnings remaining after payment of
dividends, even if it is simply retained as cash, would coistitute a *re-
serve for replacement of assets, assuming the usual situation that re-
placement must be at a higher price than historic costs. For the per-
sonal service corporation, the 40% retained would be a form of keyman
insurance.
4. Specifically integrate Sections 302, 303 and 531. If the earnings
retained in liquid form are actually used for a Section 302 'or a Section
303 redemption and have not violated any other standard, so be it. If,
in addition to the use of such liquidity, a loan is used to accomplish the
redemption, it should be specifically provided that the use of current
earnings for repayment of such loan is not the avoidance of tax with
respect to the shareholders.
5. A current ratio of 3 to 1 or less. Current assets and liabilities to
be included in such a computation are easily defined. Inasmuch as our
tests are to be applied in the alternative, and the taxpayer to be ex-
empted if he meets any one, for this purpose loans to shareholders de-
scribed above as prohibited acts would not be included as current lia-
bilities. Investments in unrelated securities which do not comprise a
43J. L. Goodman Furniture Co., 11 T.C. 530 (1948); Smoot Sand & Gravet
Corp., 241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1957); Bardahl, P-H Tax Ct. Mfem. 65-20>(1965).
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majority interest should be included in current assets. It follows that
investments in a majority interest would not be current assets. Obvi-
ously, there might be difficulty in defining investments related and un-
related to the business, however, this test should be no more difficult
than that encountered in connection with loss carry forwards of acquired
companies. It is conceded that an unnecessary short term loan could
distort a current ratio. However, this distortion can be forestalled by
annualizing loans.
6. Current assets comprise less than 25% of total assets. Using the
same definition of current assets as that to determine the current ratio,
this exemption is suggested to cover the situation where liquid assets
are stockpiled to expand or preserve the business, but in the opinion
of management, the time is not yet right to move. Borowing a concept
from the reserve ratio test introduced in Revenue Ruling 62-21, a hind-
sight test could be introduced. That is, if less than 25% of assets were
current in any one of five years following the year under review, the
intent to reinvest liquidity in the business would be proven. The test
would also be met by the acquisition of a majority interest in a diversi-
fied enterprise because we have defined such investments as a non-cur-
rent asset.
7. Proof by the taxpayer that in spite of his not meeting any of the
foregoing tests, the corporation still has not been formed or availed of
for avoidance of surtaxes on its shareholders. The burdens of proof and
going forward with the evidence would both rest with the taxpayer.
The nice questions raised by Section 534 such as that recently raised
in Chatham44 as to whether or not the taxpayer had shifted the burden
would thus be avoided. This is, of course, a return to pre-Section 534
standards, however, it is submitted that the bastion provided against the
Section 531 onslaught contained herein is considerably more substantial
than the weak reed of Section 534.
44 48 T.C. 145 (1967).
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